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FOREWORD
House Joint Resolution No. 1030, 1964 regular session,
directed the Legislative Council to appoint a committee from the
membership of the two standing education committees "to review the
program of advance refunding of bonds in the school districts of this
state, as well as the general practice of the sale of all schobl
bonds."
The following committee was appointed to carry out this and
other studies on educational matters: Representative Ruth B. Clark,
chairman; Senator Fay DeBerard, vice chairman; Senators Richard F.
Hobbs, Roy H. McVicker, and L. T. Skiffington;' and Representatives
Palmer Burch, Forrest Burns, John L. Kane, Kathleen Littler, John
Mackie, John Orcutt, Clarence Quinlan, William Stevens, and C. P.
(Doc) Lamb, chairman of the Legislative Council.
The committee wishes to thank the following people who were
so helpful in the conduct of this study: Dr. Elbie Gann, State
Department of Education; Messrs. Fred Wiesner, Bruce Newman, Harry
Lewis and Richard Burkhardt, Boettcher and Company; Mr. Robert
Kirchner, Kirchner and Company; Mr. Robert Gerwin, Coughlin and
Company, Inc.; Mr. Walter Imhoff, Hanifen, Imhoff, and Samford, Inc.;
Mr. w. A. Conklin, Bosworth, Sullivan and Company, Inc.; Mr. Frank
Hays, Attorney.
Mr. Fitzhugh Carmichael had the primary staff responsibility
for the work of this committee.

Lyle C. Kyle
Director

November 24, 1964
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COMMITTEE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Colorado General Assembly, in its 1963 session, adopted
legislation which permitted school districts to refinance their debts
prior to maturity in order to bring about a saving on interest charges
which was made possible by a changing money market -- among other
reasons -- and this procedure is called advance refunding.
The enabling legislation for advance refunding was sponsored
by the bond houses in Colorado and was backed by various school
boards and school administrators.
Between adjournment of the 1963 session and the convening of
the 1964 session of the General Assembly approximately $75,000,000 of
outstanding school debt was advance refunded.
The
$35,000,000
legislation
a refunding

school districts of Colorado normally market approximately
of school bonds per year. Prior to passage of the enabling
on advance refunding the bond houses in Colorado estimated
potential of approximately $100,000,000 in school bonds.

Recognizing that this amount, roughly three times the normal
bond activity in a year, might cause marketing problems,the bond houses
of Colorado joined together in a syndicate for the expressed purpose
of providing an orderly procedure for marketing advance refunding
bonds. This was a unilateral action on the part of the bond houses
taken without consultation with school boards, school administrators,
the department of education, or the State Board of Education. Since
the Colorado School Board Association, the Colorado School Administrators Association, the State Department of Education and the State
Board of Education, all maintain offices readily available, it appears
to the committee that the unilateral action of the bond houses in this
instance represents an apparent disregard for those groups who represent the taxpayers of this state, and who had a greater stake in
advance refunding than did the bond houses.
The committee recognizes that the volume of financing involved
in a relatively short period of time necessitated, from a good business
standpoint, that an orderly procedure of marketing the bonds be devised. However, when a school board contacted Colorado bond houses
other than the one with which it was negotiating, only to find all
Colorado bond houses involved in one syndicate, it left the members
perplexed as well as doubtful of the motive of the syndicate. Hindsight is always better than foresight but this committee has confidence
that our local school boards would have cooperated in establishing an
orderly marketing procedure, whether the one adopted by the bond houses
or an alternative procedure, as well as the other groups mentioned, had
they been .given an opportunity to do so.
The original legislation authorizing advance refunding of
school bonds did not limit the number of times a school district could
refund its debt. However, in the 1964 session of the General Assembly,
amendments were offered and adopted to limit refundings to one time
only. The bond houses split ranks on these amendments -- most supporting the proposals and a few vigorously opposing them.
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Numerous charges and innuendoes accompanied this disagreement
and then tended to create misunderstandings among school officials and
legislators. As a result H.J.R. 1030 included a directive to the
Legislative Council that it appoint a committee" ••• to review the program of advance refunding of bonds in the school districts of this
state, as well as the general practice of the sale of all school
bonds."
Questions considered by the committee in the conduct of this
study,together with comments and recommendations, are presented below:
1. Have the school districts of this state received the best
interest rate possible on original bond issues as well as advance
refunding issues?
The committee has been unable to answer this question; furthermore, it is doubtful that the answer can be obtained short of hiring
expert legal and financial counsel to audit each and every bond issue,
whether original or advance refunding, authorized by each school board
in the state.
The committee has considerable information on the interest
rates, savings to school districts and income to bond houses concerning
advance refunding issues authorized in the past 18 months.
During the 1964 session of the General Assembly there were
rumors circulating in the legislative halls that bond houses had made
unreasonable profits from advance refunding issues. One such rumor
was that bond houses had made two dollars for each dollar saved the
school districts. As can be noted from the accompanying research
report this was not the case. The average saving to the school districts per $1,000 advance refunding bond was $50.20 as opposed to an
income figure to the bond houses of $15.91 per $1,000 bond. These
figures apply to the period preceding March, 1964 during which the
several bond houses joined together in a syndicate for the purpose of
marketing the advance refunding issues. Comparable figures for the
period since March, 1964 for advance refunding issues handled by
Boettcher & Co. were $77.09 saving per $1,000 bond and $22.39 income
to the bond houses.
2. Should competitive public bidding be required by statute
for all original school bond issues?
No. The committee does not feel that competitive bidding should
be compulsory. We are jn favor of competitive procedures for nearly
all original school bond issues, but we feel that local boards of education should be free to sell bonds by negotiation in cases where there
is good reason why competitive public bidding is not desirable.
The committee wishes to encourage the use of competitive public
bidding as a general practice among school districts, however. It has
been our feeling that one of the reasons advance refunding has been
quite successful in Colorado, as opposed to other states which have
authorized advance refunding, is that interest rates on original bond
issues may have been higher than necessary. As indicated in the response
to question number one the committee has no definite proof that interest
rates have not been the best available; nevertheless, competitive public
xiv
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bidding on original bond issues will definitely demonstrate to the
general taxpaying public that every effort was made to obtain the best
interest rate possible.
Often local boards of education are not as well infor,aed about
the financial details of their bond issues and the bond market as the
representatives of the bond houses with whom they deal. Because it is
difficult for the boards of smaller school districts to supply ~hemselves with such technical information, they tend to rely on the bond
house representatives. The lack of an independent source of information
may place school districts at a disadvantage in their dealings with
the bond houses. A similar situation exists for the governing bodies
of all types of local governmental units which issue bonds.
The committee recommends that the General Assembly consider
the possibility of employing an expert at the state level who could give
assistance and advice to school districts and other local units of
government on the sale of bonds. We feel that a qualified consulting
staff at the state level could provide a valuable service for all types
of local districts. If such an office were established, school districts
and other types of districts would no longer have to depend on the bond
houses for their information. They would have their own financial
advisor whose sole concern would be what is best for the district.
3.

Should school districts be permitted to advance refund

bonds?
Yes. The committee believes · there are numerous objectives, in
addition to interest savings for taxpayers, that can be accomplished
through advance refunding; therefore, we recommend no change in existing law concerning advance refunding.
4. Should competitive public bidding be required by statute
for all advance refunding school bonds?
Saving on interest payments is not the only reason for advance
refunding of bonds. Debt consolidation, shortening of the term of
debt, and relief from debt restrictions are all laudable objectives of
advance refundings.
Most school districts do not have available on their staffs
the technical competence to work out the objectives and details of
advance refundings. Consequently, outside help must be secured either
through the retention of a fiscal agent on a consulting basis or
through negotiation with a bond house.
Because of the scarcity of fiscal agents available on a consultative basis and also because the committee recognizes that the
profit motive encourages bond houses to explore various means of saving
money for school districts, we do not recommend competitive bidding on a
compulsory basis in the instance of advance refunding.
5. Should school districts be permitted to advance refund
bond issues more than one time?
No. As indicated earlier in this report this specific question
is apparently the major cause of this study. Some people in the bond
house business charged that the reason Chapter 237, 1963 Session Laws
xv

of Colorado was amended in the 1964 session to prohibit more than one
advance refunding, was to cover up excessive profits the bond houses
made on the first time advance refundings.
The committee has explored this charge thoroughly and finds it
without foundation. As indicated in the research portion of this report concerning thre~ successive theoretical advance refundings for
the Rangely School Dtstrict it is very apparent that additional savings
can be accomplished by successive refundings. Also, a careful study
of that example, as well as others, will demonstrate why the interast
rate that is peculiar to the fourth refunding issue could not be
achieved in the first advance refunding issue.
6. Did the existence of the bond house syndicate for the
period of approximately one year prior to March, 1964 restrict competition in the marketing of advance refunding issues?
Sufficient evidence has been presented to the committee to
indicate that the existence of the syndicate did not absolutely prevent
competition. There were individual refundings that occurred during
the existence of the syndicate where competition from firms other than
the ones in the syndicate was achieved.
However, it appears to the committee that the existence of
the syndicate tended to make it extremely difficult for school districts to secure competitive bids when such were desired.
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SCHOOL BONDING PRACTICES IN COLORADO
To support the foregoing recommendations, results of research
by the Legislative Council staff and related materials are presented
under headings as follows: Advance Refunding of School Bonds in
Colorado, Steps Involved in the Advance Refunding of School Bonds in
Colorado by Negotiation, Advance Refunding of Colorado School Bonds
Before and After Dissolution of the Colorado Account, Statutory
Provisions, and Practices With Respect to the Sale and Advance Refu'nding of School Bonds in States of the United States, Notes Based Upon
"Public Sale Versus Negotiation in the Marketing of Municipal Bonds, 11 ·
and Aspects of the Decision of Colorado Municipal Dealers to Syndicate
General Obligation Advance Refunding Bond Issues, the latter being
a letter from Fred Wiesner, Manager of the Bond Department of Boettcher
and Company, to Lyle C. Kyle, Director of the Colorado Legislative
Council.
Advance

Refunding of S9h9ol Bonds

in

Colorado

The Colorado General Assembly in 1963 authorized school districts
~o refund school bonds, spelling out in some detail conditions under
which this may be done. Because the law provides for the refunding of
school bonds if same are callable or redeemable within ten years after
the date of issuance of the refunding bonds, refunding is permissible
in Colorado long before the bonds of original issue can be redeemed.
Such refunding is commonly called "advance refunding." Using the term
in this sense, the purpose here is to examine some of the concepts,
basic considerations, and problems involved in advance refunding.
Specifically, this section of the report is concerned with (1) the
?dvance r~funding ~oncept as applied to.Colorado school bonds, including {for 1llustrat1ve purposes) an examination of what could be
·
accomplished through successive advance refundings of the Rangely
School District bonds if such refundings were Rermissible, (2) purposes
for which school bonds are advance refunded, (3) possible consequences
of extensive advance refundings, and (4) appraising the fairness of a
refunding agreement.
The Advance Refunding Concept as Applied to Colorado School Bonds
The refunding of school bonds is analagous to the refinancing
of any bonded indebtedness. For any of a number of reasons it may be
to the debtor's advantage to liquidate the existing debt and replace
it by one in which the objectionable features have been ameliorated
or eliminated. A common reason for refinancing, in general, is that a
change of some kind -- in the money market, for example -- has taken
place making it possible to borrow money at a lower interest rate than
that of the existing debt. Under these conditions -- assuming callability of the bonds of original issue -- it may be and frequently is
sound management to issue refinancing or refunding bonds and use the
proceeds to retire the original issue •
. Because of the tax-free status of school bonds, it becomes
additionally desirable (from the point of view of the taxpayer in the
school district in question) to advance refund school bonds. This is

true in accordance with Colorado law (123-12-7), as will be illustrated
in following paragraphs. The total bond interest and/or the principal
amount of the debt may be reduced. substantially by use of the advance
refunding device.
The proceeds from refunding are drawn upon to purchase direct
Obligations of the U.S. Treasury; and such purchases are made in
sufficient amounts and according to a pre-computed schedule synchronized to pay the principal of and the interest on the bonds being
refunded, as well as any required prior redemption premiums. When the
advance refunding transaction involving Colorado school bonds is complete, all of the required government obligations are placed in an
irrevocable trust (escrow) in a bank in Colorado possessing trust
powers and FDIC membership.
There is no speculation in this trust; it is composed of !lQ.!l=.
callable treasury obligations only; and the trustee cannot sell any
of these treasury obligations ahead of maturity. Idle cash balances
may be invested by the trustee in Treasury Bills so long as maturity
of same is such as to satisfy payment of the refunded issues. Income
derived from reinvestment by the trustee, if any, accrues to the
benefit of the school district at the termination of the escrow. It
is further provided that, with the escrow provisions met, the refunded
bonds "shall not be deemed outstanding bonds" so far as bonded indebtedness is concerned. Moreover, because of the provision with respect
to callability or redeemability noted above, the School Board has
freedom to choose an opportune time for entering into a refunding·
agreement.
To illustrate what can be accomplished by refunding operations,
facts pertaining to the actual advance refunding of a $2,380,000 debt
of Rangely School District No. RE-4, Rio Blanco County, are presented,
together with similar information on three hypothetical successive
advance refundings of the Rangely School District bonds.
The bonds of original issue bore an interest rate of 4~ on
all maturities. Because this is higher than the yield rate on U.S.
Treasury obligations, the cost of the governments for escrow purposes
necessarily exceeded the principal amount of the bonds, $2,380,000.
The total cost of the governments in this instance, including a
financing fee of $2,887.50,was $2,491,096.01. Since the School Board
did not provide funds to offset the so-called escrow loss or loss on
governments which resulted, said loss of $111,096.01 had to be met by
selling the refunding bonds at premiums; and this is true because the
principal amount of tha refunding issue, by law, cannot exceed the
principal amount of the bonds of original issue. Thus, the refunding
bonds necessarily bore higher interest rates than would normally be
required by the School District so that the underwriters could realize
sufficient gross income to offset the escrow loss.l
1.

Under conditions different from those which existed in the Rangely
refunding operation, there may be a so-called escrow gain or gain
on the governments rather than a loss. If the interest rates on
the bonds to be refunded are lower on an average than the yield
rates at which governments for like maturities can be bought, the
cost of the governments for escrow purposes will be less than the
principal amount of the bonds to be refunded. This difference is
called an escrow gain or gain on the governments.
- 2 -

Despite the sizable escrow loss on the actual refunding of the
Rangely school bonds, the average bond interest rate on the refunding
issue was 4.17%, a reduction from 4.50% on the bonds of original issue.
The principal amount of this refunding issue was the same as that of
the original issue, but the required bond interest payments were decreased by $116,825.
Details of the hy~othetical illustration are set forth in
Tables I and II (pp. 5-7); they pertain to three consecutive
hypothetical refundings of the actual refunding issue dated May 1,
1963, of Rangely School District bonds having a principal amount of
$2,380,000. With reference to Table II particularly, note should be
taken of the conditions or assumptions underlying the analysis leading
to its preparation. Important among them are the following: (1) all
government bonds are priced -- for the hypothetical refunding analyses-as of August 16, 1963, the date of closing of the actual refunding,
(2) the offering scales or yields for all hypothetical refundings are
the same as those for the actual refunding, and (3) the three different
hypothetical refundings have the same maturity schedules as the actual
refunding, except that there is a reduction of $49,000 in principal
in the final maturity in the last of these refundings.
A further assumption is implicit in the analysis, namely, that
the market for Rangely School District bonqs would not be impaired by
the successive refundings. Upon completion of what corresponds to the
third hypothetical refunding -- four refundings in all -- the Rangely
School bonds in the hands of investors would be increased by approximately 9~ million dollars. Whether the market would absorb this
increase without an increase in the yield rate is questionable.
In the first hypothetical refunding operation (a refunding of
the ~ctual refunding bonds), the escrow loss, though still sizable, is
greatly reduced; the average bond interest rate is reduced from 4.17%
to 3.80%; and the principal amount of the issue remains unchanged.
In the second hypothetical refunding operation (a refunding of
the bonds whose average bond interest rate is 3.80%), the escrow loss
is small; the average bond interest rate is reduced to 3.45%; and the
principal amount of the bonds remains unchanged. It is emphasized, as
explained above, that this reduction in average bond interest rate from
the first to the second hypothetical refunding is arrived at under the
assumption of identical conditions, including those pertaining to yield
rates on municipal bonds. Because the bond interest rate reduction is
substantial, it is clear that a smaller (though sizable) rate reduction
could take place under conditions of considerably larger yield rates
on the refunding bonds than on the bonds being refunded.
In the third hypothetical refunding operation (a refunding of
the bonds whose average bond interest rate is 3.45%), it was decided
to reduce the bond interest rate only slightly and determine to what
extent the principal of the debt could be reduced. With a reduction
in bond interest rate to 3.40% only, it was found that the principal
of the debt could be reduced by $49,000 -- from $2,380,000 to
$2,331,000.
The above provides an illustration of an important limitation on
what can be accomplished in one refunding operation. If a bond interest
- 3 -

schedule like that of the first hypothetical refunding operation (3.80
per cent for all maturities) had been set for the actual refunding,
with no other change in the basic assumptions and conditions, there
would have been a loss to the Coforado Account (before overhead) of
$4.28 per $1,000 par value of the refunding bonds. This result is
arrived at by noting, in Table II, that total direct costs in the
11 Actual Refunding 11 column ($120,383)
exceed gross income from underwriting in Column A under "Hypothetical Refundings" ($110,188) by
$10,195 and then by dividing the latter figure by 2,380. If concessions
to selling dealers are assumed to be the same as for the actual refunding ($22,347), an underwriting loss of $32,542 before overhead ($10,195
plus $22,347), or $13.67 per $1,000 par value of the refunding bonds,
is obtained. The simple reason for this loss is the fact that the
interest rate (3.80 per cent) on the refunding bonds, under the conditions indicated, is not high enough to yield, on the sale of these
bonds, the amount of money required to finance the refunding operation.
If the conditions of the second hypothetical refunding had been
assumed (3.45% bond interest on all maturities) in the actual refunding, th~ loss to the Colorado Account (before overhead) -- based upon
total direct costs in the "Actual Refunding" column of Table II and
gross income from underwriting in Column B under 11 Hypothetical Refundings" -- would have been $59,686 or $25.08 per $1,000 par value of the
refunding bonds. Assuming the same concessions as above to the selling
dealers, the underwriting loss (before overhead) would have been $34.47.
The average underwriting and selling profit (before overhead)
for the four refunding issues described above is $17.44 per $1,000 par
value of the refunding bonds; for the actual refunding operation it
was $19.18.
Purposes For Which School Bonds Are Advance Refunded
School bonds are advance refunded for four basic purposes. There
is the objective, first, of reducing the burden to the taxpayer arising
from debt servicing. Second, there may be the desire to spread maturities
over shorter or longer periods, depending upon circumstances, than those
of the bonds presently outstanding. Third, it may be necessary to
reduce the existing indebtedness to make possible additional borrowing
within debt limitations. Fourth, debt consolidation or other corrective
measures may be desired for a variety of reasons. Two or more of these
objectives can commonly be gained in one refunding operation; each will
be examined in following paragraphs.·
Examples have already been presented showing how bond interest
payments or principal amount of the debt, or both, can be reduced by
refunding.
The credit standing of a school district may be adversely
affected by the existence of outstanding bonds with maturities extending far into the future. Under such conditions, the refunding operation
may be employed to convert the debt to one with maturities extending
over a shorter period, thereby improving the district's credit standing to the point conceivably that additional bonds could be sold at
lower interest rates than would otherwise be possible.

- 4 -

Table I
PRINCIPAL AMOUNTS OF BONDS (ORIGINAL AND REFUNDING), BOND INTEREST RATES
AND YI ELD RAT ES ON REFUNDING.: RANGELY SCHOOL DISTRICT No. RE-4,
RIO BLANCO COUNTY, COLORADO

Year
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967

U'

Building
Bonds Dated
!',"lay 1, 1959
Principal
Due 11/1
(Int. -~ 4Y-,%)
$

140,000
140,000
140,000
140,000
140,000

Refunding
Building Bonds
Dat§d May 1 1 1963 Principal
Interest
Due 11/1
Rate
$

140,000
150,000
150,000
150,000
150,000

4.5%
4.5
4.5
4.5
4.5

Hypothetical Refunding Bonds Dated
Aug. 1 1 1963 -- PrinciQal Due l-1/1
C
A
B
( Int .@3. 8C'%) ( Int .@3 .45%) ( Int .@3 .40%)
$

140,000
150,000
150,000
150,000
150,000

$

140,000
150,000
150,000
150,000
150,QOO

$

Yield
Rate
On All

Refundinqs

140,000
150,000
150,000
150,000
150,000

1.80%
2.00
2.20
2.40
2.50

1968
1969
1970
1971
1972

140,000
140,000
140,000
140,000
140,000

150,000
150,000
150,000
150,000
150,000

4.5
-3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5

150,000
150,000
150,000
150,000
150,000

150,000
150,000
150,000
150,000
150,000

150,000
150,000
150,000
150,000
150,000

2.60
2.70
2.80
2.90
3.00

1973
1974
1975
1976
1977

140,000
140,000
140,000
140,000
140,000

150,000
150,000
150,000
150,000
145,000

3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
4.0

150,000
150,000
150,000
150,000
145,000

150,000
150,000
150,000
150,000
145,000

150,000
150,000
150,000
150,000
145,000

3.10
3.20
3.30
3.35
3.40

140,000
1401000
$2,380,000

145,000

4.0

145,000

145,000

96,000

3.40

$2,380,000

----

$2,380,000

$2,380,000

$2,331,000

1978
1979
Total

Table II
RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS:

ACTUAL AND HYPOTHETICAL REFUNDINGS OF RANGELY SCHOOL DISTRICT BONDS
Original
Issue

Effects of Refunding:
Principal amount
Interest to maturity
Total principal and interest

Summary of Underwriter's Receipts and
Expenditures:
1 Receipts:
oGross sales price of refunding bonds
Discou~ted value of "B" coupons
Total
Cost of refunding bonds (par)
Gross income from underwriting
Deduct direct costs
Escrow bank fee
Cost of U.S. Treasury obligations in excess
of par proceeds of refunding issue
Beginning cash balance required for escrow
Consideration, escrow agreement
Approving attorneys' fees
Bond printing
·
Travel, CPA fees, telephone
Total direct costs

ffi

Hypothetical Refundinfu

Ifil

C

$2,380,000 $2,380,000 $2,380,000b $2,380,000b $2,331,000b
910,350a
793,525a
701,100
636,525
601,894
3,173,525
3,081,100
3,016,525
2,932,894
3.290.350

Savings:
Reduction in principal
Reduction in interest paid to maturity
Total reduction in principal and interest
Average rate of interest

Actual
Refunding

$
4.50%

-o-

116,825
116,825

$

4.17%

$2,488,096
57,939
2,546,035
$

$

2,380,000
166,035

-o-

92,425c $
92,425C
3.80%

-o-

64,575
64,575

$

3.45%

49,000
34,631
83,631
3.40%

$2,490,188

$2,440,697

$2,384,556

2,490,188

2,440,697

2,384,556

-o-

$

2,380,000
110,188

-o-

$

2,380,000
60,697

-o-

$

2,331,000
53,556

4,200

4,200

4,200

4,200

111,096
453
10
3,207
393
1.024
120,383

65,163
806
10
3,207
393
1,024
74,803

5,467
422
10
3,207
393
1,024
14,723

6,376
231
10
3,166
385
1,020
15,388

$

$

$

Table II
(continued)
Original
Issue
Total profit to underwriters (before
overhead)
Deduct concessions to selling dealers
Underwriting profit (before overhead)
Underwriting profit (before overhead)
per $1,000 par value of the refunding bonds
Total profit (before overhead) per $1,000
par value of the refunding bonds

Actual
Refunding

To1
$

$

45,652
221347
23,305

$

9.79

$

19.18

$

Hypothetical Refundinfil

1fil

$

$

45,974
221347
23,627

$

38,168
221347
15,821

5.48

$

9.93

$

6.79

14.87

$

19.32

$

16.37

35,385
221347
13,038

$

$

$

$.

·C

-J

a.
b.
c.

Interest prorated to May 1, 1963.
Interest prorated to August 1, 1963.
Not fully comparable with other savings shown because of the difference between the "prorated"
dates of May 1 and August 1, 1963.

If the problem of credit standing is not involved and there is
the desire to spread the burden to the taxpayer over a period of increased length, thereby reducing the annual tax required to service
the debt, the refunding issue cart be set up to accomplish this objective. This, however, is subject to the limitation lunless voter
approval to the contrary is obtained) that neither the average bond
interest rate nor total bond interest payments of the refunding issue
shall exceed those of the bonds to be refunded. If the maturities are
extended too far into the future, the required bond interest payments
will be increased.
With reference to the third of the reasons for refunding
mentioned above, that of reducing the bonded debt, it is noted that the
premiums at which the refunding bonds can be sold are an important
determinant of the extent of the possible reduction in the principal
amount of the bonds and that the premiums, in turn, are dependent in
large part upon the bond interest rates. To make the desired reduction
in the bonded debt, therefore, it is necessary to set the bond interest
rates as high as feasible, subject to the limitation noted above.
Under conditions that sometimes exist, debt consolidation may
be a highly desirable objective. Among the bonds that were refunded
for Jefferson County School District R-1, for example, sixteen separate
bond issues and eight separate payment dates during the year were
represented. It was possible to refund all of these in five refunding
issues with only two payment dates during the year, namely, March 1
and September 1. This brought about an obvious potential saving in
clerical and administrative costs incident to debt servicing: and the
choice of payment dates to agree closely with property tax payment
dates means that loss from idle funds being held to service the debt
was reduced: C?rrection of a~y marke? irregularity from year to year
that may exist in the tax levies required to service the debt may be
accomplished in any refunding.
It is generally desirable for a school district to have its
bonds rated by such services as Moody's Investor Service and the
Standard and Poor Corporation. Inasmuch as size of the issue has a
bearing upon the willingness of these services to rate the bonds, debt
consolidation may serve to accomplish this end.
Depending upon circumstances, it may be feasible and desirable
to issue refunding bonds in denominations different from those of the
bonds currently outstanding. By issuing them in denominations of
$5,000 instead of $1,000, for example, it is understood that collection
charges may be decreas~d.
Possible Consequences of Extensive Advance Refundings
Students of public debt management are by no means in complete
agreement as to the merits of advance refunding. Although it may be
employed to accomplish much-to-be-desired ends, as pointed out in the
above discussion of purposes for which school bonds are refunded,
cognizance should be taken of possible consequences of extensive use
of it.

- 8 -

In an article by John Gerrity in Daily Bond Buyer (February 27,
1964), it is noted that total advance refundings by states and localities increased from $54 million in 1961 to $261 million in 1962 and to
$1.2 billion in 1963; and J. Anthony Naylor, in "Advance Refundings"
(a publication of B. J. Van Ingen & Co., Inc.), states that the 1963
figure represented "more than 12% of the total volume of municipal
financing" for that year.
A major concern over this trend, on the part of what appears
to be an increasing number of debt managers, including some at the
Federal level, stems from the double use of the tax-exempt privilege.
According to John Gerrity in the article referred to above, the title
of which is "Treasury Concerned by Refunding Growth; Warns of Peril to
Tax-Exempt Privilege," the debt managers of the Treasury "argue that
the effect of this practice, arising out of the spread in yields, is
to permit states and localities to use their right to issue tax-exempts
for the acquisition of income they could not obtain if the tax-immunity
on refunding as well as original issues did not exist. This, Treasury
officials say, is an abuse, and may lead to restrictive action by
Congress, limiting the circumstances under which the traditional taximmunity may be used, and specifically eliminating refunding issues
from that immunity." Moreover, it appears that there are many in the
municipal bond fraternity generally who oppose use of the advance
refunding device.
Basic to this concern are the facts (1) that many of the bonds,
of both original and refunding issues, are commonly expected to remain
unredeemed for a period of some years, and (2) that the drain on
available investment funds resulting from this double financing of
identical projects could conceivably be large enough to increase interest rates on bond flotations. It should be noted in this connection
that-the Treasury doesn't question refunding if the refunding issue
does not precede the maturity or call date of the outstanding issue by
an unrealistically long period. And, here, Mr. Gerrity suggests the
desirability of self-policing as a means of exercising control.
Other matters of concern to students of public debt management
may be stated as follows: (1) the tax-exempt privilege is already
under intensified Congressional scrutiny as a "tax loophole'' largely
because of increasing use of industrial aid financing by state and
local governments, (2) refunding is regarded as a risky device when the
bonds are sold substantially in advance of the time when use of the
proceeds is planned, the thought being that the range of safe prediction rarely exceeds six months, and (3) some contend that tax-immunity
is outmoded and challengeable on constitutional grounds.
Appraising the Fairness of the Refunding Agreement
A fair appraisal of a refunding agreement requires consideration of (1) interest rates on the bonds to be refunded, (2) the
financial stability or economic base of the district backing the bonds,
including size of the bond issue, and (3) the condition of the bond
market as of the date of the agreement, including the rates at which
government bonds could be bought, and comparative bond maturities.
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To determine the comparative fairness of two different refunding agreements from the point of view of bond interest rates alone,
much more than a simple comparison of the interest-maturity schedules
on the two sets of refunding bonds is required. If the interest rates
on the bonds to be refunded are higher than those at which government
bonds can be bought, the cost of governments required for escrow
purposes will, as already noted, exceed the principal amount of the
bonds to be refunded. Because a refunding issue of larger total amount
than that of the issue to be refunded is not permissible, this means
(unless the School Board provides funds for the purpose) that the refunding bonds will have to carry interest rates high enough to
sell at premiums sufficiently large to account for this excess and
defray expenses of the refunding operation. Depending upon the in~
terest rates of the bonds to be refunded, therefore -- to say nothing
of other considerations -- there may be wide differences among the
bond interest rates of refunding issues under conditions of identical
return to the bond houses. To obtain fair comparative measures of the
returns to the bond houses, mathematical analyses of the refunding
operations, as already shown, are needed.
The fact that a sizable real property base with little or no
outstanding indebtedness has its impact upon the rating of the refunding bonds and hence upon the yield rates at which the bonds can be
sold does not need to be be-labored. To explain why this impact upon
yield rates must be reflected in the level of bond interest rates, it
is noted (in case of escrow loss on refunding, for example) that
sufficient premium must be realized to cover this loss and defray•
expenses. Because variations in yield rates affect the premiums at
which bonds can be sold, this means that differences in bond backing
or bond quality should be reflected in bond interest rate differences.
Moreover, since overhead costs per bond are generally higher for
small than for large bond issues, size of bond issue becomes an item
of significance.
There is an obvious close relationship between condition of
the bond market (as of the date of the refunding agreement) and the
yield rates to be realized on refunding bonds; this is likewise true
of rates at which government bonds can be bought; and these facets of
the problem, in turn, are closely related to what the interest rates
on the refunding bonds should be. So far as bond maturities are
concerned, it should be noted that yield rates on bonds with early
maturities are generally lower than they are for later maturities and
hence that average yield rates are dependent to a degree upon comparative maturities.
In light of the above statements it seems clear that there is
no easy, off-the-cuff basis for saying that one refunding agreement is
more fair or less fair to the school district than another. A reasonably thoroughgoing analysis of each is required.
Summary
A few of the conclusions drawn from this phase of the study
are pinpointed as follows:
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1. If interest rates on bonds to be refunded are comparatively
high, so also will the interest rates be on the refunding bonds unless
funds to cover the escrow loss are available independent of the refunding operation. This is true because the cost of the governments required for escrow purposes will exceed, by a considerable margin, the
principal amount of the bonds to be refunded and the interest rates on
the refunding bonds will have to be high enough to yield, on sale of
them, a total premium sufficiently large to cover this escrow loss and
other expenses of refunding. It follows, therefore, that the comparative fairness of two refunding agreements cannot be appraised by a
simple comparison of the interest rates on the two issues of refunding
bonds.
2. If successive refundings were permissible, the opportunity
thus provided to trade repeatedly on the tax-free status of school
bonds would make possible savings, on each refunding, to the taxpayers
in the school district concerned. The Rangely refundings, for example,
could be continued with small reductions in bond interest rates and
substantial reductions in the principal amount of the bonds.

3. There are hazards in successive advance refundings which
could conceivably outweigh the advantages that might be derived. The
added volume of bonds outstanding in the hands of investors could
cause substantial advances in the yield rates of municipal bonds, thus
increasing the cost of borrowing money; and this abuse of the taximmunity privilege, as many regard successive advance refunding to be,
could lead to adoption of restrictive measures by Congress.
4. These hazards with respect to successive advance refundings are believed by some students of public debt management, including a few at the Federal level, to exist to a degree when only one
advance refunding of original issue bonds is permitted. The concern
in this instance stems from the fact that states and localities can
issue tax-exempts in the double financing of identical projects to
acquire income which they could not obtain if the tax-immunity on the
original and refunding issues did not exist. It is noted, however,
that one advance refunding can serve a highly desirable purpose many
times entirely aside from the saving in interest and/or debt reduction.
It may be used to spread maturities over longer or shorter periods and
to bring about corrections of various kinds, including consolidation
of existing debt and reduction of clerical and administrative costs
incident to debt servicing.
Steps Involved in the Advance Refunding of School Bonds
in Colorado by Negotiation
The procedure followed in the advance refunding of school bonds
in Colorado by negotiation involves steps as set forth below. To assist
the reader in visualizing what takes place, details of the negotiation
in the actual refunding of school bonds for Rangely School District
No. RE-4 in Rio Blanco County are presented. The principal amount of
the bonds refunded was $2,380,000. The refunding took place in
accordance with an agreement between Boettcher and Company and the
Board of Directors of the District dated June 24, 1963, and detailed
in a resolution adopted by the Board on July 20, 1963.
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Step 1. Contact is made between the bond house and the school
board. ~ither party may take the initiative in making the contact. In
the large majority of cases to d~te, however, the contacts have been
made by bond houses.
On the initiative of Boettcher and Company, a company representative met with th~ Board of Directors of Rio Blanco School District No.
RE-4 on December 10, 1962, and presented a proposal which, assuming
passage of proposed legislation to be introduced to the Colorado General
Assembly during January, 1963, called for a statement of intent that
Boettcher and Company would be given the opportunity to try to effect
the refunding of the bonds. This proposal, agreed to on said date,
involved no obligation on the School District's part to contract this
refunding with Boettcher and Company; it was merely an understanding
that the Company would be given the opportunity to present a plan, or
plans, of refunding for the District's consideration. From the point
of view of Boettcher and Company, the proposal was entered into for
the purpose (1) of gaining support for the proposed legislation and
(2) of securing an opportunity to attempt the financing in the event
the enabling legislation was passed.
Step 2. The bond house explains generally what can probably be
accomplished by advance refunding, setting forth different alternatives
but making no firm commitment as to details at this point because the
necessary analytical work has not been done. As explained at some
length elsewhere, possibilities as to what can be accomplished through
advance refunding include (1) reduction of burden to the taxpayer· arising from debt servicing, (2) spreading of maturities over shorter or
longer periods and equalizing required tax levies from year to year, (3)
reduction of existing indebtedness to make possible additional borrowing
within debt limitations, and (4) debt consolidation to reduce clerical
and administrative expenses incident to debt servicing, or other
corrective measures. In the light of extensive discussion of these
and related matters with the bond house representative the school
board makes a decision as to what it would like to accomplish through
refunding; and this decision provides a basis for detailed analysis
by the bond house.
(Step 2 may require a series of sessions of the
bond house representative with the school board.)
On May 14, 1963, Mr. Yaeger, Superintendent of Schools, contacted Boettcher and Company concerning Boettcher's interest in their
refinancing program •. In preparation for a meeting of the School Board
on June 10, 1963, Boettcher and Company made an analysis (believed to
be more extensive than is common at this stage of the negotiation) of
the refunding possibilities available to the School District. On the
basis of this analysis a company representative, in addition to
discussing the concept and the potentials of refunding at said meeting,
presented several alternative plans of refunding for the Board's consideration. The Board took no formal action at the meeting; it asked
for mo~e time to consider the proposals; and it requested that certain
revisions be made in the plans submitted.
Step 3. The bond house does the necessary analytical work and
firms up a proposal which, in its judgment, would meet the expressed
desires of the board. Involved in this analytical work are (1) a
determination of the amount of the U.S. Treasury obligations, by ·
maturities, that must be bought to make bond interest and redemption
payments (as they come due) on the bonds to be refunded, (2) a check
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on the bond market for governments to determine the prices at which
the required governments could be bought and the total cost thereof,
(3) an examination of the bond market for municipals to determine the
probable yield rates (for different maturities} at which refunding
bonds issued by the district could be sold, and (4} a determination of
the interest rates on the refunding bonds which are necessary, on the
sale of these bonds, to yield the amount of money required to support
the refunding operation,
Since school boards are generally not staffed to do what is
called for in both this step and the preceding, it is noted that a plan
whereby public sale of refunding bonds (with competitive bids} would
be required would necessitate an arrangement to have this service
rendered by some one else. Whether this service were rendered by a
private company for a fee or by a state-supported agency, it should be
recognized that a highly trained staff would be a prime essential to
successful operation. Included in the needs are one or more analysts
capable of doing the technical \\Ork described above, one or more
specialists in market trends as they relate to prices of both municipals
and governments, and a means of keeping in close touch with market developments.
It is noted further that the rendering of this service appears
to involve both a science and an art. As a science, it is concerned
with the technical analytical work and the knowledge of market trends
referred to above; the requirements in these respects can probably be
met reasonably satisfactorily in the environment of a state agency.
On the other hand, tying in with the need for a means of keeping in
close touch with market developments, it appears that an art may be
involved in making the necessary decisions pertaining to market transactions in the light of these developments. If so -- if gaining and
maintaining the needed skill requires extensive day-to-day experience
in ~he handling of these transactions -- a question may be raised as
to whether it would be wise to place the responsibility of making such
decisions in the hands of a state agency.
Between June 10 and June 24, Boettcher and Company revised its
analytical work to comply with the Board's request at the June 10 meeting and extended it to the point of being able to make firm commitment
on either of two plans called Plan A and Plan B. After considering
the proposals, the School Board (at its June 24, 1963, meeting} accepted
refunding Plan A and entered into an underwriting agreement with
Boettcher and Company & Associates. Refunding Plan A stipulated a
reduction in the average interest rate from 4.5% to 4.17~% and a
reduction in interest payment to maturity (prorated to May 1, 1963} of
at least $115,221.25. This plan actually decreased the School
District's average annual debt service requirements as compared to
existing debt service requirements. Under refunding Plan B, which was
not accepted by the District, the reduction in interest paid to
maturity would have been at least $193,920.00. This plan required a
slight increase in average annual debt service requirements over a
slightly shorter maturity schedule. The District apparently preferred
refunding Plan A in order that a slight decrease in the mill levy
requirements necessary to service their bonded indebtedness might be
effected.
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It is noted that, at the meeting on June 24, 1963, the Board
received a competitive proposal from an underwriting group comprised
of three investment bankers from.Kansas City.
Step 4. The proposal prepared by the bond h?use in Step 3 or
some modification of it, as agreed upon by the parties, forms the
basis for the refunding agreement. If said proposal is modified
significantly, a re-computation in part may be necessary. Before the
aoreement is finalized, the bond house representative makes clear to
the school board what the refunding would accomplish for the school
district, including a guaranteed stated reduction in the average
bond interest r~te (from th8 bonds to be refunded to the refunding
bonds) and a guaranteed amount to be saved.
In line with general business practice, the bond house commonly
does not disclose what it expects to make on the refunding transaction;
and such disclosure was not made to the Board in the course of the
Rangely negotiations. However, for purposes of illustration in this
report, the Rangely figure is revealed; as discussed at greater length
elsewhere, it is $9.79 per $1,000 par value of refunding bonds (before
overhead), from which such items as staff time required to confer with
the board and do the necessary analytical work, rental of quarters and
equipment, secretarial services, office supplies and expense, and
general company overt1ead must be subtracted. There is no cost accounting for these overhead items.
Immediately following the June 24 meeting of the Rangely Bbard
the analytical work was finalized to yield the details of the refunding
agreement which were incorporated in the July 20, 1963 resolution of the
Board referred to above. On July l, 1963, Boettcher and Company wrote
the District and advised them that the interest coupons ultimately
set on the refunding bond issue resulted in a slightly larger saving
to the School District than indicated in the underwriting agreement
dated June 24, 1963. The total reduction in interest (prorated to
May l, 1963) amounted to $116,825.00, or $1,603.75 more than the
savings originally indicated in the underwriting agreement. The net
effective interest rate on the refunding issue, based upon the interest
cost reduction of $116,825.00, was 4.166%.
In addition to the interest saving outlined above, the District
will realize an additional saving resulting from a law enacted by·the
1964 session of the Colorado Legislature which eliminated, effective
July l, 1964, the 1% fee charged by some County Treasurers on the
proceeds received from refunding bond escrows. Since the 1% treasurer's
fee was provided for in the case of the escrow refunding the District's
debt, these funds, totalling $27,271.72, will revert back to the
District. Also reverting back to the School District will be the
return realized from the reinvestment of idle cash in the escrow.
While sµch a return, if any, cannot be anticipated at the present time,
the minimum savings to be realized by the District will be $116,825.00
plus $27,271.72, or a total of $144,096.72.
Step 5. The computations made to determine the amount of the
escrow that is needed to meet the bond interest and redemption payments
(as they come due) on the bonds to be refunded are verified by a certified public accountant; and the proposed refunding agreement is
checked by attorneys to see that it is legal in all respects. Commonly,
both the accountant and the attorney are employed by the bond house.
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It is noted in this connection that most of the legal work in Denver
has been done by Tallmadge and Tallmadge or Dawson, Nagel, Sherman,
and Howard.
Subsequent to the execution of the underwriting agreement on
June 24, 1963, Boettcher and Company retained a firm of nationally
recognized municipal approving attorneys to prepare all proceedings,
resolutions and agreements requisite to the issuance of the refunding
bonds. A firm of Certified Public Accountants was also retained to
verify the proposed transactions in the refunding escrow in accordance
with the requirements of the enabling law permitting refundings of
this nature.
Tallmadge and Tallmadge had the responsibility for the legal
proceedings throughout the refunding operations; and Peat, Marwick,
Mitchell and Company verified the escrow requirements. This verification
was certified to by letter dated July 17, 1963.
Step 6. The refunding bonds are printed; offering circulars
are prepared indicating the yield rates at which these bonds may be
bought; and, at the time the bonds are sold, U.S. Treasury obligations
are bought and placed in escrow according to the predetermined requirements. Inasmuch as this step is taken subsequent to the time at which
the refunding agreement is finalized, some change in the bond market
is likely to have taken place in the meantime. The price at which the
governments can be bought and the price at which the refunding bonds
can be sold tend to move up together or down together. If they move
up, for example, the paper loss on the governments tends to be offset
by a paper increase in the premium at which the refunding bonds can be
sold. The result is that a paper loss (or gain) on one transaction
tends to be offset by a paper gain (or loss) on the other. While this
offsEtting tendency exists, an element of risk to the bond house is
involved which may turn in a given instance to the advantage or the
disadvantage of the bond house. This, of course, stems from the fact
that the bond house has previously entered into a binding contract
with the school board.
It should be noted (1) that the underwriter purchases, for his
own account, the U.S. Treasury obli9ations required to effect and,
establish the refunding escrow and \2) that these governments must be
available on the date of closing and delivery of the refunding bonds
to the ultimate purchasers before a legal opinion attesting to the
validity of the refunding bond issue can be rendered by the municipal
approving attorneys. If, for any reason, the transaction is not
consummated, the risk involved in the ownership of the governments is
the underwriter's only; subsequent resale of them, assuming that the
underwriting is not consummated, will ordinarily result in a gain or
loss, such gain or loss to accrue to the underwriter. In the purchase
of the government obligations, the underwriter arranges all financing
and there is no obligation on the part of the School District in this
respect.
In the Rangely refunding, the underwriters purchased the required
governments between June 24, 1963, and July 10, 1963. The refunding
bonds were offered on or about July 1, 1963, in accordance with an
offering circular issued shortly pribr thereto. The escrow agreement
was finalized on Au9ust 16, 1963.
- 15 -

The details of the financial transactions involved are set
forth as follows:
(a) To meet the escrow requirements, Boettcher and Company
bought $2,310,000 par value of government bonds and $~58,000 of Treasury
Bills at a total cost of $2 491,096.01. This amount includes a
financing fee of $2,887.50 il/8 of 1% on the par value of the government
bonds) which was paid by Boettcher and Company to Boettcher Investments,
Inc. The latter, it is understood, was not a part of the Colorado
Account.
(b) The Rangely School District sold $2,380,000 par value of
refunding bonds for a cash outlay to Boettcher and Company of $2,380,000,
said refunding bonds having interest rates which averaged 4.17%. See
the last paragraph under (c) below.
(c) The Rangely School District paid $2,380,000 to Boettcher and
Company in part payment of the governments for the escrow. The selling
of the refunding bonds at premiums in (b) above provided additional
funds to finance the refunding operation.
According to the terms (Item #3) of the June 24, 1963 contract,
the District was required to deposit in the escrow account the $2,380,000
par proceeds, plus $31,237.50, representing the interest accruing from
the next preceding interest payment date of May 1, 1963 to the date of
closing, August 16, 1963, during which period the District had an actual
liability toward its refunded debt. The District received,. in addition
to the $2,380,000 par payment tor its refunding bonds, $27,314.59 in
accrued interest on the new issue. The difference between these two
interest items is $3,922.91, and the difference occurs in the fact
that the rate of accrual of interest on the refunding issue is slightly
lower than it is on the refunded issue because of the different
arrangements of interest coupons on the two issues. The difference,
however, is part of the total interest difference (or interest
reduction) of $116,825 when the interest on both issues is figured to
maturity.
(d) The Colorado Account, of which Boettcher and Company was
the manager, sold the refunding bonds to various members of the Account
for a total of $2,465,749.60; and the same were sold by the various
members of the Account to the ultimate purchasers for $2,488,096.60.
The difference between these two figures, $22,347.00, is the amount of
the concessions paid by the Colorado Account to its various members as
a selling commission in marketing the bonds.
(e) Attached to the refunding bonds, as printed, were (1) 11 A11
coupons with rates of interest ranging from 3½ per cent to 4~ per cent
and (2) 11 B11 coupons of ½ of 1 per cent per annum "for the period
Novemb~r 1, 1963, to November 1, 1973, inclusive, or to th~ respective
maturity dates of the bonds to which said 'B' coupons are attached,
whichever is the earliest date.
Prior to the sale of the refunding
bonds, the 11 8 11 coupons were detached, the discounted value of which
thereby became additional income to Boettcher and Company. The total
amount of these 11 B11 coupons (before discounting) was $78,250. The
discounted value of these coupons, at 7% per annum (3~ per six months),
calculated from September 1, 1963, amounted to $57,938.75. This
discounted value is the income which accrued to the Colorado Account
from this source.
11
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(f) The above are the first five items shown in the table of
receipts and disbursements (Table III) associated with the Rangely
refunding operation, with the three offsetting items discussed in the
second paragraph of (c) above di.sregarded. Presented in it also are
other items of expense which are believed to be self-explanatory. The
difference between the receipts and the disbursements, $23,305.57, is
the underwriting profit (before overhead) to the Colorado Account.

Step 7, Upon completion of the refunding transaction, the bank
with which·the escrow is placed accepts the responsibility, according
to terms of the escrow agreement, of administering the escrow and making bond interest and redemption payments on the refunded bonds as they
come due1 and the school board has the responsibility of making such
payments on the refunding bonds. The refunded-bonds have been eliminated
from the legal debt of the school district; replacing them are the
refunding bonds.
In the Rangely refunding, the escrow is administered by the
Denver U.S. National Bank. ·
As stated above, the underwriting profit realized from the
Rangely refunding (before overhead) per $1,000 par value of refunding
bonds was $9.79. On the entire issue of $2,380,000, this amounted to
an underwriting profit (before overhead) of $23,305.57. To this figure
is added $22,347.00, the combined concessions to various dealers, out
of which staff salaries (both professional and clerical), telephone
costs, shipping and insurance fees·, and other costs of doing business
were defrayed~ The underwriting and selling profit (before overhead)
totaled $45,.6¢2.57 or $19.18 per $1,000 par value of the refunding
bonds. The financing fee of $2,887.50, which represented income to
Boettcher Investments, Inc., but not to the Colorado Account, is
supplemental to this figure. When this is added to the above, a total
income {before overhead} of $48,540.07 to the bond houses, or $20.39
per $1,000 par value of the refunding bonds, is obtained. The saving
of the Rangely School District spread over the life of the bonds (with
interest prorated to May 1, 1963} will total at least $116,825, or
$49i09 per $1,000 par value of the refunding bonds, to which is added
the 1% treasurer's fee allowance of $27,271.72.
Table III
RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS: COLORADO ACCOUNT
REFUNDING OF RANGELY SCHOOL DISTRICT BONDS
Receipts
\
From Rangely School District toward
escrow requirements
Sale of refunding bonds to Account
Members
Discounted value of 11 8 11 coupons
Disbursements
Purchase of governments for escrow
purposes
Refunding bonds from Rangely
School District
Escrow bank fee
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$2,380,000.00
2,465,749.60
57.938.75

$2,491,096.01
2,380,000.00
4,200.00

$4,903,688.35

Table III
(continued)
· Beginning cash balance required
for escrow
Consideration, escrow agreement
Approving attorney 1 s fees

Bond printing
Travel, CPA fees, telephone

Underwriting profit (before overhead)

453.40

1a.aa

3,206.44
393.05
1,023.88

4,880,382.78
$

Concessions to selling dealers (before
overhead)

23,305.57
22,347.00

Total profit to underwriters (before overhead)

$

45,652.57

Underwriting profit (before overhead)
per $1,000 par value of the refunding bonds

$

9.79

Total profit (before overhead) per $1,000
par value of the refunding bonds

$

19.18

Advance Refunding of Colorado School Bonds Before and
After Dissolution of the Colorado Account
In foregoing references to the actual refunding of school bonds
for Rangely School District No. RE-4 in Rio Blanco County, facts were
presented on saving to the school district, gross income from underwriting, expenses of refunding (including escrow loss), concessions to
selling dealers, underwriting profit (before overhead), and total profit to underwriters (before overhead). The purpose of this section of
the report is to present similar data for what, it is understood, comprises all refundings of Colorado school bonds by the Colorado Account
during the period of its existence and all such refundings -- from
dissolution of the Account to August 1, 1964 -- in which Boettcher and
Company was involved as the sole bond house concerned or as one of two
or more participants. This is done for each of a number of groups
according to credit rating of the school district, namely, AA, A, BAA,
and non-rated.
Included in this study is a total of $98,022,000 par amount of
refunding school bonds. The refundings through the Colorado Account
totalled $81,680,000; and those handled by Boettcher and Company and
associates in the Post Colorado Account period totalled $16,342,000.
Other refunding school bonds in Colorado which have been issued since
the enabling legislation was passed in 1963, the total of which is not
known precisely, are known to have approximated $22,000,000. This means
that t~e par amount of refunding school bonds issued in Colorado during
the period of twenty months from March 1, 1963, to November 1, 1964,
totals approximately $120,000,000.
The tabular categories listed above should be described. The
saying to the school district consists of reduction in bond interest
over the life of the bond issue and/or in par value or redemption price
(if different from par value) of the bonds; as reported, it excludes
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the 1% County Treasurer's fee which was included in the escrow in
refundings which took place prior to passage of the law removing it;
it was computed from original proposals made to the districts or in
some instances it was taken direttly from the authorizing resolutions;
and some of the computations and tabulations were made from sources
more readily available to save time.
Gross income from underwriting comprises gross sales price of
refunding bonds to ultimate purchasers (as projected at the time of
"sale'' to the selling dealers), discounted value of "B" coupons (if
any), and escrow gain (if any)~ cost of refunding bonds (at par).
Here, it was not unusual, during the period in which the Colorado
Account was in existence, for the actual sales price to the ultimate
purchasers to be less than the projected sales-pric~, thus having the
effect of reducing the selling dealers' income. It is understooa
that the actual sales price was never greater than the projected sales
price. Gross income was computed from offering circulars; in three or
four instances, it included undiscounted values of short "B" coupons
or supplemental coupons; and all dollar production achieved from the
sales was computed from the dates of the refunding issues and not from
the actual dates of delivery to the underwriters or to the ultimate
purchasers.
Takedowns and concessions to the selling dealers are the
difference between the projected sales price and the price at which
the bonds were sold to the selling dealers. It is noted (1) that, in
view of the above, the reported takedowns and concessions as a whole
are an overstatement of the true income in this category to all bond
houses combined, (2) that a sizable part of the takedowns and concessions to selling dealers during the Colorado Account period -roughly estimated to be one-half of the total -- went to dealers outside of Colorado, (3) that the realized takedowns and concessions are
befoie overhead and that t~ overhead of selling dealers comprises
staff salaries -- both professional and clerical -- telephone costs,
shipping and insurance fees, and other costs of doing business, and
(4) that the figures presented are close approxim~tions, subject to
the above qualifications, obtained by deducting expenses of refunding
and profit from underwriting (before overhead) from gross income from
underwriting.
Expenses of refunding include escrow loss (if any), beginning
cash balance required for escrow, escrow bank fee, consideration for
the escrow agreement, approving attorneys' fees, bond printing, travel,
CPA fees, and telephone costs. Expenses of refunding including escrow
loss were taken from the account settlement statements.
Underwriting profit (before overhead) is gross income from
underwriting less takedowns and concessions to selling dealers and
total expenses of refunding; it was taken from the account settlement
statements. Overhead, in this instance, comprises salary items for
staff time required to confer with school boards and do the necessary
analytical work, rental of quarters and equipment, secretarial
services, office supplies and expense, and general company overhead.
The savings to Colorado school districts from a total of
twenty-three advance refundings during the Colorado Account period, in
principal and interest but exclusive of the 1% County Treasurer's fee,
amounted to $4,100,740; and the income (before overhead) to the Colorado
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Account resulting therefrom, takedowns and concessions to selling
dealers and underwriting profit combined, totalled $1,299,21~2 (Table
IV). This means that the savings to school districts spread over the
life of the bonds were $3.16 for each dollar of income to the Colorado
Account before overhead. The corresponding figures for the period
subsequent to dissolution of the Account, based upon eight refundings,
are: savings to school districts, $1,259,811; income to the bond
houses before overhead, $365,892; and savings to school districts per
dollar of income to the bond houses, $3.44.
If the 1% Treasurer's fee is included with principal and
interest savings, the total savings to the school district during the
Colorado Account period, per dollar of income to the Colorado Account,
were $3.92 (instead of $3.16); and, for the period subsequent to
dissolution of the Account, they were $3.44 (unchanged by change of
the law).
It is noted that the underwriters were instrumental in calling
to the attention of the various school officials involved in refunding
the additional savings that could be effected by the elimination of
the County Treasurer's one per cent collection fee. As a result, the
Codification of School Laws Committee recommended the repeal of the
law, which recommendation was adopted by the General Assembly in the
1964 session.
In the Rangely refunding the saving to the School District
per dollar of income to the Colorado Account was $2.56. This is based
upon a saving of $116,825 as reported elsewhere. If the alternative
proposal to the Rangely School District calling for a saving of
$193,920 had been accepted, the saving per dollar of income to the
Account -- assuming the same income as in the actual refunding -- would
have been $4.25. This illustration is presented as a caution against
drawing hasty conclusions based upon cursory comparisons of the results
of one refunding operation with those of another. The greater saving
in the Rangely refunding would have required an increase in the tax
levy over a comparatively short period; the plan preferred by the Board
called for spreading the maturities over a longer period so as to bring
about a small reduction in the tax levy.
The results of refunding in the Colorado Account period are
compared with those which took place subsequent to dissolution of the
Account; this is done in terms of dollars per $1,000 par value of
refunding bonds for each credit rating class to which the school
districts belong and for all such classes combined (Table V).
Total income to the bond houses (before overhead) per $1,000 par
value of the refunding bonds, takedowns and concessions to selling
dealers and profit from underwriting combined, were smaller for total
refundings of the Colorado Account l$15.91) than they have been since
the dissolution of the Account ($22.39). Comparative figures for takedowns and concessions to selling dealers are $5.60 in the Colorado
Account period and $8.33 in the Post Colorado Account period; and for

2.

As noted elsewhere, a sizable part of this item
roughly estimated to total $225,000 -- went to dealers outside of Colorado.
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Table IV
ADVANCE REFUNDING OF SCHOOL BONDS IN COLORADO BY CREDIT RATING OF THE SCHOOL DISTRICT
(All Data Expressed in Total Dollar MTIOunts)

Credit
Ratina

Principal
& Interest
Savina

Par
Amount
Refunding

l Per Cent
Treasurer's Fee
A.

,:..;.,
A

BAA

Non-rated
TOT,-..L

Total
Saving

$2,611,648.80

$596,909.32

$3,208,558.12

15,924,000

610,924.90

185,853.90

9,550,000

528,731.64

8,423,000
$81,680,000

349,434.40
$4,100,739.74

B,

,_.
$

$159,171.49

$468,615.53

796,778.80

448,467.78

121,987.32

128,702.78

197,777.68

319,765.00

120,030.71

648,762.35

227,111.50

88,936.17

64,537.93

73,637.40

162,573.57

85,746.89
$988,540.82

435,181.29
$5,089,280.56

385,609,47
$1,832,884.37

102,267.04
$457,799.13

181,257.25
$533,669.45

101,385.18
$841,415.79

204.352.22
$1,299,214.92

$

612,524.13

Advance Refunding Subsequent to Dissolution of the Colorado Accountc
$

6,420,000

314,740.72

0.00

314,740.72

Non-rated
TOT ,..L

~4~,000
$16,342,000

35,205,00
$1,259,811.49

0.00
0.00

35,205,00
$1,259,811.49

b.
c.

$

$143,908.60

$ 9,373,000

a.

$

771,695.62

"
s-

909,865.77

Takedowns &
Concessionsa

Underwriting
Total
Profit
Takedowns &
Concessions and
Before
Overhead Underwriting PrQfi1

Advance Refunding by the Colorado Accountb

$47,713,000

r-J

Gross
Income

Expenses
Including
Escrow

0.00

$

909,865.77

$

$

261,861.30

$ 51,925.92

$ 82,547.82

$127,387.56

192,194.95

80,491.36

15,476.12

96,227.47

15,609.70
469,665.95

3,645.00
$136,062.28

2,750.00
$103,773.94

6,214.70
$229,829.73

179,313.48
176,718.83

$

9,fl59,70
365,892.01

"sizable part of the takedowns and concessions to selling dealers during the Colorado ,-..ccount period
roughly estimated to be one-half of the
total -- went to dealers outside of Colorado.
All advance refundings of school bonds by the Colorado Account.
All advance refundings of school bonds in Colorado from dissolution of the Colorado Account to August 1, 1964, in which Boettcher and Company
was involved as the sole bond house concerned or as one of two or more participants.

Table V

ADVANCE REFUNDING OF SCHOOL BONDS IN COLORADO BY CREDIT
RATING OF THE SCHOOL DISTRICT
(Dollars per $1,000 Par Value of the Refunding Bonds)
Colorado
Account

Credit Rating and Classification

Post
Colorado
Account

Saving to the School Districts
Principal and Interest
AA

$54.74
38.37
55.36
41.14
50.20

A

BAA
Non-Rated
Average
One Per Cent Treasurer's Fee
AA
A
BAA
Non-Rated
Average
Total Saving
AA
A

BAA
Non-Rated
Average
Gross Income from Underwriting
AA
A

BAA
Non-Rated
Average
Takedowns
AA

&

$ ---

97.07
49.03
64.13
77.09

12.51
11.67
12.57
10.10
12.10

o.oo
o.oo
o.oo
o.oo

67.24
50.04
67.93
51.24
62.31

97.07
49.03
64 .13
77.09

16.17
28.16
23.78
45.40a
22.44

27.94
29.94
28.43
28.74

3.02
7.66
9.31
12.12
5.60

5.54
12.54
6.64
8.33

3.34
8.08
6.76
21.34a
6.53

8.81
2.41
10.47
6.35

Concessions to Selling Dealersb

A

BAA
Non-Rated
Average
Expenses of Refunding, Including Escrow Loss
AA
A

BAA
Non-Rated
Average

- 22 -

Table V
(continued)
Colorado
Account

Credit Rating and Classification
Profit from Underwriting (Before Overhead)
AA
A

BAA
Non-Rated
Average
Total Takedowns & Concessions and Profit
From Underwriting (Before Overhead)
AA
A

BAA
Non-Rated
Average
a.

b.

$

9.82
12.42
7.71
11.94
10.30

12.84
20.08
17.02
24.06
15.91

Post
Colorado
Account
$

---

13.59
14.99
11.32
14.06

19.13
27.53
17.96
22.39

The expense (including escrow loss) for the non-rated bonds is
above average because of a large escrow loss resulting from a high
bond interest rate on a large block of refunded bonds and this,
in turn, necessitated an offsetting above-average gross income.
A sizable part of the takedowns and concessions to selling dealers
during the Colorado Account period -- roughly estimated to be onehalf of the total -- went to dealers outside of Colorado.

profit from underwriting they are $10.30 and $14.06, respectively. 3
By credit rating classes there are several exceptions to this relationship between the two periods.
It should be noted that the above figures are not fully comparable -- one period with the other -- because of differences in
weighting. Since both takedowns and concessions and profit from underwriting are lower for Class AA bonds per $1,000 par value than they
are for the average of all classes, the absence of AA bonds in the Post
Colorado Account period (in contrast to a sizable volume of such bonds
in the Colorado Account period) gives the averages for the Post Colorado
Account period an upward bias. It is found, however, that weighting
the figures (for the three classes A, BAA, and non-rated for which
there are data in both periods) according to the distribution of bonds
among these classes in (1) the Colorado Account period and (2) the
Post Colorado Account period yields averages for the latter period -for takedowns and concessions and profit from underwriting combined -3.

These figures do not include the financing fee, an expense to the
Colorado Account, which was paid to Boettcher Investments, Inc.
This fee of 1/8 per cent on the principal amounts of the government
bonds placed in escrow represents additional income, in a sense, to
the bond houses.
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which are larger than those for the Colorado Account period. For
takedowns and concessions alone, this procedure yields somewhat smaller
averages for the Post Colorado Account period than for the Colorado
Account period; in the case of profit from underwriting, the averages
so obtained for the Post Colorado Account period are considerably the
larger.
Takedowns and concessions to selling dealers are perhaps the
only category shown in the table in which there is a significant
relationship between magnitude of the figures and rating class. One
would expect the cost of selling AA bonds to be less per $1,000 of par
value of the refunding bonds than it would be for A bonds, and similarily
for A bonds as compared with BAA bonds and for BAA bonds as compared with
non-rated bonds. This relationship did exist in the Colorado Account
period and, with one exception, in the Post Colorado Account period. In
the case of savings to the school districts, the fact that other objectives than that of maximizing savings are significant tends to blur
the picture. Likewise, as already noted, conditions peculiar to a given
situation such as high interest rates on the bonds to be refunded may
cause the expenses of refunding and hence the gross income from underwriting to be abnormally high.
Because the Rangely refunding has been used for purposes of
illustration and the Rangely School District is non-rated, a comparison
of the results of refunding in that district with averages for all nonrated districts is of interest. The saving to the District per $1,000
par value of refunding bonds exceeds the average for all non-rated
districts in all three categories shown (Table VI); and, if the
alternative proposal discussed elsewhere in this report had been accepted, the disparities would have been far greater. Gross income from
underwriting for Rangely is comparatively large, but this is necessarily
so to offset the large escrow loss which resulted from the fact that
the interest rate on the refunded bonds was high. Income to the bond
houses per $1,000 par value of the refunding bonds is smaller for
Rangely, both in takedowns and concessions and in profit from underwriting (before overhead), than it is for the non-rated group as a
whole. The combined income to the Colorado Account (before overhead)
per $1~000 of par value is $19.18 for the Rangely refunding, whereas
the average for all non-rated districts is $24.06 (Table VIJ.
Table VI
RESULTS OF THE RANGELY REFUNDING COMPARED WITH THE NON-RATED
SCHOOL DISTRICT AVERAGES DURING THE COLORADO ACCOUNT PERIOD
(Dollars per $.1 ,000 Par Value of the Refunding Bonds)
Non-Rated
Classification
Rangely
Average
Saving to the School Districts
Principal and Interest
One Per Cent Treasurer's Fee
Total Saving

$49.09
11.46
60.54

$41.14
10.10
51.24

Gross Income from Underwriting

69.76

45.40

9.39

12.14

Takedowns and Concessions to Selling Dealers
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Table VI
(continued)
Classification

Rangely

Non-Rated
Average

Expenses of Refunding Including Escrow Loss

$50.58

$21. 34

9.79

11.94

19.18

24.06

Profit from Underwriting (Before Overhead)
Total Takedowns & Concessions and Profit from
Underwriting (Before Overhead)

Statutory Provisions and Practices with Respect to the Sale and
Advance Refunding of School Bonds in States of the United States
Letters were sent to the "chief State School Officers" in the
forty-nine states of the United States exclusive of Colorado requesting information on the permissibility of advance refunding and on
legislative provisions governing or practices pertaining to the sale
of school bonds in their respective states. Facts presented in fortyfive replies to these letters are summarized below.4
Method of Selling Original Issue School Bonds
Public sale of original issue school bonds is known to be
required -- with exceptions in a number of instances -- in twenty-seven
states and not to be required in twelve states (Table VII). Many of
the exceptions are believed to be worthy of examination; they are
described below largely in the words of the respective respondents.
Delaware: Public bidding is required for bond issues, and the
school building commission determines the bid to be accepted.

4.

In a number of instances there is failure, in these replies, to
answer all of the questions; and in others, there is uncertainty as
to the facts of the situation. Take the question as to whether
advance refunding is permissible as an example. The Attorney
General in North Dakota is quoted as saying that refunding is not
included among the specified purposes of issue and that there are
no court decisions dealing with it. In the letter from Nebraska
it is stated that advance refunding is not specifically authorized,
but that some legal authorities contend that it is permissible. A
statement of similar import appears in the letter from Idaho. In
other cases, with no specific statements of this nature, the wording
of the letters would appear to leave uncertainty in the reader's
mind on this point. From Hawaii comes a statement that issues
confronting Hawaii are believed not to be pertinent or applicable
to the situation in Colorado; and there are no answers to specific
questions.
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Florida: Public sale with competitive bids or auction for the
bonds is required. However, if all bids for the bonds are rejected,
the county school board may negotiate for the sale of the bonds at a
price at least as advantageous as that represented by the best bid
received. The respondent states that he has never heard of sale by
auction in Florida and that the provision for negotiating a sale is
rarely, if ever, used at the present time.
Idaho: The sale of bonds is restricted to competitive bidding
unless the school district accepts the bid of the Department of
Investments.
Iowa: Any or all bids may be rejected and sale may be
advertised anew, or the bonds or any portion may thereafter be sold
at private sale. In the case of private sale, the bonds shall ~e
sold upon terms not less favorable to the public than the most
favorable bid made at the last advertised sale.
Michigan:
private sale.

Bonds totalling less than $10,000 may be sold at

Minnefota: Exceptions to the public sale requirement are those
obligations!) issued under a home rule charter or a law specifically
authorizing a different method of sale, (2) payable wholly or partly
from the proceeds of special assessment, (3) payable wholly from the
income of revenue-producing conveniences when such obligations do not
exceed $50,000, and (4) sold to any board, department, or agency·of
the United States or of the State of Minnesota.
Montana: The general practice is for the board of trustees of
the school district issuing the bonds to receive sealed bids if any
are presented at the time set for the sale of the bonds. Whether or
not sealed bids have been received the school board then accepts
auction bids which in some instances result in considerable competition
between or among prospective purchasers of the bonds.
New Jersey: Bonds may be sold at private sale, without giving
notice of sale, if the total amount offered for sale is $10,000 or
less, or if the sale is to the trustees of the teachers' pension or
annuity fund, or to any board, body or official of the State authorized
to purchase said bonds. In all other cases bonds shall be sold at
public sale.
New Mexico: Bonds must be sold on bids in a public sale unless
bought by the State, a. practice that has not been in existence for some
seven or eight years in New Mexico.
New York: There are two instances when bonds need not be sold
at public sale. One instance is when they are sold to the United
States Government or to a pension fund or sinking fund of the issuer.
The other case when they may be sold at a private sale is when the
bonds issued are not in excess of $30,000.
North Dakota; The prescribed procedure relative to calling
for bids upon the sale of municipal bonds shall not be required in
case bonds are sold to the state board of university and school lands
or to the Bank of North Dakota nor in case other trust funds admin- 26 -

istered by public officials are invested in them, or they are sold
to the United States of America, or any agency or instrumentality
thereof.
Ohio: Before selling any notes or bonds of a subdivision,
the taxing authority shall offer such notes or bonds at par and
accrued interest to the trustees, commissioners, or other officers
who have charge of the sinking fund of the subdivision, and su~h officers
shall have the option of purchasing said notes or bonds or rejecting
them. If this offer is rejected, then notes having a maturity of one
year or less may be sold at private sale at not less than par and
accrued interest, and all bonds and notes having a maturity of more
than one year shall be sold to the highest bidder, after being advertised once a week for three consecutive weeks on the same day of the
week.
Vermont: The provision that bonds must be sold by competitive
bidding is qualified by the statement that, if there are no bids on
the issue, the legislative branch may sell the bonds at private
sale at not less than par and accrued interest.
Wyoming: The provision requiring public sale with competitive
bidding is qualified by the statement that the school trustees are
authorized to reject any bids and to sell the bonds at private sale,
if they deem it for the best interests of the district.
Of those who answered the question as to which method of sale
public or by negotiation -- of original issue school bonds was considered preferable, the large majority indicated that they considered public
sale preferable. However, of the forty-five reporting states, only
fourteen indicated a preference; and three of those gave the answer
"yes." with the proviso that the bond issues are large.
Advance Refunding of School Bonds
Twelve of the states are known to have provisions for the
advance refunding of school bonds and twenty-one are known not to
have such provisions. In only eight of these states is it known that
advance refunding of school bonds has actually taken place.
Seven of the twelve states reporting provisions for advance
refunding of school bonds require public sale of the refunding bonds.
In one of these instances the respondent says that all bids may be
rejected, whereupon the county school board may negotiate for the sale
of the bonds at a price at least as advantageous as that represented
by the best bid received. In another instance -- Minnesota -- the
exceptions noted above to the public sale requirement for original
issue bonds apply to refunding bonds as well. Four of the respondents
report that public sale of the refunding bonds is not required.
It appears that five and possibly six of the states have laws
permitting advance refunding of advance refunding school or other
bonds (i.e. more than one advance refunding); but there is no
information available to the Legislative Council staff, from this
study or from any other source, indi~ating that advance refunding of
advance refunding school bonds has actually occurred.
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Alaska and Tennessee, in their prov1s1ons as to method of bond
sales, distinguish between bonds of original issue and advance refunding bonds. For bonds of origina~ issue, public sale is required;
for advance refunding bonds, sale by negotiation is permitted. This
distinction appears to reflect recognition of the fact that determination of what can and should be accomplished in a refunding operation
requires far more expertise than is required when bonds of original
issue are to be sold. In the latter case, many of the details such
as total amount of the issue, schedule of redemptions and provision
as to callability, and bond interest rates are commonly determined in
advance of taking steps to sell the bonds.
Under these circumstances -- with information on these details
in hand and with knowledge of the current condition of the bond
market and of the community backing the bonds -- the computations
required on the part of bond companies to arrive at a reasonable
bid are not extensive; and it is not unreasonable to expect carefully
prepared bids from a number of bond houses.
In contrast, it is clear from facts already presented on advance
refunding (1) that the objectives of advance refunding are varied,
(2) that the desires of the school board must be reflected in the
planning of the refunding operation, and (3) that determination of
what can be accomplished, consistent with the board's wishes, requires
the expertise referred to above. Because school boards are generally
not staffed to do the necessary analytical work, some means of
collaboration of the board with an expert on the subject appears to
be needed when advance refunding operations are being planned. This
collaboration may conceivably be had from (1) negotiation as in the
past, (2) a bond firm employed by the school district for a fee,
(3) a private consultant, or (4) a fiscal agent in the employ of the
state.
Table VII
METHOD OF SALE OF ORIGINAL ISSUE SCHOOL BONDS
A.
Alabama
Alaska
Arkansas
Delaware
Florida
Idaho

Indiana
Iowa
Maryland
Michigan
Minnesota
Montana
B,

California
Connecticut
Kansas

*

States Known to Reguir 5 Public Sale*
Nevada
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
.North Dakota

Ohio
Oregon
South Dakota
Tennessee
Vermont
Washington

West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

States Known Not to Require Public Sale
Maine
Massachusetts
Missouri

Nebraska
New Hampshire
Pennsylvania

Texas
Utah
Virginia

Included in this group are several states which make exceptions,
as noted elsewhere, to the public sale requirement.
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Notes Based Ugon "Public Sale Versus Negotiation
In the Marketing of Municigal Bonds"
The Investment Bankers Association of America issued a
Statistical Bulletin (Occasional Paper No. 2) in September, 1962, on
11
Public Sale Versus Negotiation in the Marketing of Municipal Bonds."
Notes based upon this report -- reproduced verbatim in large part
are presented below.
Municipal bond sales in the United States in 1961, general
obligations and revenues combined (as compiled by the IBA and revised
to September, 1962) totalled $8,448 million. Those sold by the issuer
by publicly inviting bids amounted to $7,312 million or 86.6% of the
total; the remainder, $1,136 million, were sold through negotiation.
Of the total bonds issued, $6,045 million were general obligation bonds;
and $2,403 million were revenue bonds.
Issuers of general obligation bonds used the public sale
technique significantly more frequently than did issuers of revenue
bonds. Of the general obligation total, 96.9% were sold this way,
whereas only 60.6% of the revenue bonds were so marketed.
This pattern for 1961 is essentially the same as it was in
two previous years, 1957 and 1958. The tabulation follows:
ISSUES SOLD THROUGH PUBLIC BIDS
(Per Cent of Par Dollar Value)

1957
1958
1961

General
Obligations

Revenue

94.4%
95.3
96.9

65.3%
72.9
60.6

In number of issues (instead of dollar volume) the proportion
of general obligations sold at public sale in 1961 was 90.2% (instead
of 96.9%); and for revenues it was 68.6% (instead of 60.6%).
The reasons for the wide variance between general obligation
issues as a group and revenue issues as a group, whether in terms of
dollar volume or number of issues, are in part legal. A substantial
number of states have laws requiring that general obligation issues
be offered for bids. While some revenue bond acts have the same
requirement, most do not.
While legal factors no doubt are a major reason why general
obligations as a group are sold at public bidding significantly more
frequently than are revenues, they are not the only explanation.
Successful public offering requires a "market name." Further, small
issues are less likely than large issues to be rated and small issues
usualy come from small issuers. In addition, certain costs of public
offerings, such as the cost of advertising for bids, are relatively
independent of the size of the offering. This alone may make
negotiation with a local firm the least costly method for a very
small issue, even if a public offering is possible.
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In the case of general obligation issues, the 1961 results
appear to be precisely in line with what one would expect from market
and legal factors just discussed •.
In the case of revenue issues,· one further major factor enters.
New issuers are formed to finance specific construction projects,
which are often major undertakings -- toll roads, bridges, airports.
Since these are not market names, the market must be cultivated both
before and after the sale. Among other things, this requires considerable consultation between the issuer and investment bankers in
order to tailor the securities to the needs of both buyers and seller.
Negotiation seems quite appropriate in these cases.
Since there were a number of extremely large new construction
facilities financed through revenue bond issues in 1961, the data on
the revenue bond methods of sale for that year also appear consistent
with relevant legal and market factors.
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October 27, 1964

Mr. Lyle C. Kyle, Director
Legislative Council, Colorado General Assembly
Room 341, State Capitol
Denver, Colorado
Re:

Aspects of the Decision of Colorado Municipal Dealers to
Syndicate General Obligation Advance Refunding Bond Issues

Dear Mr. Kyle:
Refunding is a universally accepted and thoroughly tested aspect of long-term
debt financing, employed in every state, and simply stated is the substitution of
one bond issue for another, the proceeds of which are used to retire the outstanding or refunded issue. (Multiple issues are commonplace, but for this discussion
we will use only a singular issue). The advantages of refunding might be interest
savings, debt realignment and revision of security provisions, as well as several
other less important advantages.
Advance refunding is refinement of this technique. Refunding bonds are issued·
to ·replace existing indebtedness where such indebtedness is not callable for redemption at the time of the refunding. The proceeds of the refunding issue are invested in United States Government securities, which, together with interest, are
sufficient to pay when due or called the principal, interest and call premiums on the
refunded debt. The advance refunding technique has been employed for nearly thirty
years to effect refinancing to prevent default in some instances and to eliminate
restrictive covenants which prohibited the issuance of additional debt in others.
It has only been in recent years that advance refunding has been employed to effect
large reduction in interest (and sometimes principal) requirements, as well as to
achieve more liberal repayment provisions. Advance refunding has grown rapidly in
the past five years and in 1963 bond issues sold to effect advance refundings
amounted to approximately $600 million.
The first major use of advance refunding in this area occurred in New Mexico
for municipal issues of revenue bonds. Every major city of New Mexico has advance
refunded its revenue debt, attesting to the acceptance and popularity of this procedure. It resulted in substantial saving to the issuers and allowed for the issuance of additional bonds necessary to finance expansion of the utility systems.
Boettcher and Company was a leader in the application of advance refunding
techniques in New Mexico and after analyzing desirable ends achieved, studied the
possibility of sponsoring legislation in Colorado to provide this same technique
to refund general obligation issues of school districts. Study showed a substantial
saving could accrue to the taxpayers, and.to implement this program, the following
steps were taken:
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Mr. Lyle C. Kyle
October 27, 1964

1.

Dawson, Nagel, Shennan & Howard and Tallmadge & Tallmadge, recognized
bond counsels, were employed to prepare legislation to provide for
advance refunding.

2.

Members of the Colorado State Legislature were contacted and the
desirable goals to be achieved by such legislation were explained.

3.

Many school districts were contacted, several of which granted
"study contracts" and helped support the necessary legislation.

To compensate for expense and effort, the study contracts provided that
Boettcher and Company would be given an opportunity to purchase refunding issues
resulting from this program, but the school districts retained the right to reject
any proposal submitted and negotiate with other interested parties at a later date,
or to reject the proposal in its entirety.
Boettcher and Company contacted school districts prior to the introduction of
legislation and obtained "Study Contracts" to analyze the refunding of approximately
$60 million of outstanding bonds. At this point, no other municipal dealer was involved in our efforts. As school districts were contacted concerning the proposed
study contracts, other municipal dealers became aware of the effort and contacted
Boettcher and Company to detennine the procedures to implement advance refunding
made possible by passage of the enabling legislation. All school districts we·re
potential candidates for refunding and because of the potential volume and the
limited staff of Boettcher and Company, other dealers were invited to assist in this
effort and to lend support for the proposed legislation. Subsequently when each
municipal underwriter joined in this effort, each was allocated a proportionate interest and did not share in any contracts taken prior to that date.
In late October of 1962, joint account arrangements with other municipal underwriters had been made by Boettcher and Company covering perhaps forty issues; these
arrangements varied from issue to issue and involved most municipal underwriters in
Denver. Some underwriters had a financial interest in only a portion of the "Study
Contracts" obtained and that interest depended on the specific allocations made at
the time the joint effort was decided.
Colorado school financing has an approximate annual volume, excluding Denver
School District No. 1, of $35 million per year under normal conditions. It was
evident that, with the anticipated refunding volume of perhaps $100 million in
addition to the normal new financing, the underwriters were faced with'a serious
problem of distributing this enormous increase in Colorado school general obligation
issues to banks, insurance companies, trust accounts and individuals who had purchased these issues in the past. This problem indicated the need for the new issues
moving to the market at a controlled pace, depending upon market conditions, to allow
the market to absorb this volume without a serious adjustment in interest rates.
With "Study Contracts" already obtained involving about twenty-five issuers totaling
approximately $100 million of bonds, the mormal market for Colorado municipal obligations would be hard pressed, if not completely overwhelmed, by the tremendous
volume that would be offered in a relatively short period of time without control.
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Mr. Lyle C. Kyle
October 27, 1964

Timing of underwriting the refunding issues was necessary to maintain interest
rates at realistic levels and as a consequence, the "Study Contracts" already obtained by each underwriter were contributed to a conmon pool with percentage interests as follows:
Boettcher and Company
Bosworth, Sullivan & Company
Coughlin and Company, Inc.
Hanifen, Imhoff & Samford, Inc.
Kirchner and Company
Stern Brothers and Company
Ranson and Company
George K. Baum and Company, Inc.
Francis I. duPont and Company
Hornblower and Weeks
Goodbody and Company
J. K. Mullen Investment Company
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.
Quinn and Company

18.2%
9.6%
9.6%
· 9.6%
8.1%
8.1%
6.0%
5.0%

4.6%
4.6%
4.6%
4. 0%

4.0%
4.0%
100.0%

These percentages were agreed to in March 1963, and although the percentages indicated varied slightly from the original agreement, these variations were due to some
underwriters discontinuing their municipal activity in the State of Colorado. Percentage interest of each participant was determined after negotiation among the
parties concerned and primarily rested on the following factors:
1.

Financial status and underwriting ability.

2.

The ability of the firm to distribute municipal obligations to ultimate
purchasers.

3.

The number of "Study Contracts" obtained by the respective members at the
time of this agreement.

4.

The ability of the individual firms to contribute personnel to the job of
calculating the many factors involved in the consummation of any refunding
program.

In addition to the necessity for a common effort in underwriting the anticipated
volume, substantial out-of-pocket expenses had been incurred, i.e. legal, travel, etc.
which had to be shared by the underwriting firms and some method was necessary to
determine each member's share of these expenses which were in fact defrayed on the
basis of the percentage interests indicated above. It might be pointed out here that
at the time it.was decided to combine efforts, Boettcher and Company's interest was
determined at 18.2%, which percentage of the total was far less than the amount of
the ''Study Contracts" already obtained by Boettcher and Company. Boettcher and
Company's willingness to join this conunon effort was necessitated by a volume of financing which they individually would have been unable to underwrite and distribute
successfully without the necessity of exce~sively high interest rates and a corresponding reduction in the saving to Colorado school districts.
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Mr. Lyle C. Kyle
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Upon the successful passage of the proposed legislation, the Colorado dealers
involved nominated Boettcher and Company as manager of the group with duties to
arrange for the purchase of the refunded issue and the sale of this issue to the
ultimate purchaser through the underwriting group ~hich had already been organized.
In addition, Boettcher Investment Co., Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of Boettcher
and Company, arranged for the purchase and the financing of the government obligations necessary to effect any refunding program. For these services, Boettcher
Investment Co., Inc. was paid $1.25 (1/8 of 1%) per $1,000 of government bonds purchased for the benefit of this group. This fee was paid by all members in proportion
to their interest in the account. At one time, Boettcher Investment Co., Inc. either
owned or was committed to purchase government obligations with a market value of
approximately $50 million. Such commitments require substantial capital, willingness
to assume risk to assure some chance of profit. Boettcher and Company was assisted
in the management decisions by Coughlin and Company and Stern Brothers & Company.
These management decisions concerned primarily determining the price levels for the
refunding issues and when the issues were to be offered for sale by the account.
As stated previously, the original agreement which activated this group in the
underwriting of advance refunding issues was agreed to in March 1963 and that original
agreement provided the account would disband in March 1964 since it was felt that the
initial heavy volume of advance refunding would have been achieved by that date and
that subsequent thereto, a more nonnal volume of financing would occur and not·require
a concerted effort of the entire group of underwriters. The account was formed only
for general obligation advance refunding issues and did not extend to new money issues,
revenue issues, special obligations issued by the State of Colorado or any political
subdivisions. The account was limited to one activity only--general obligation advancl·
refunding bonds; that account was made for a predetermined period of time, namely
one year. There was no attempt on the part of the underwriters to conceal the fact
that such an account existed. In fact, it was frequently emphasized to issuers. In
no instances were out-of-state underwriters asked to participate in this program when
such dealers evidenced an interest in Colorado refundings. It was the consensus of
opinion of the Colorado group that the purchase of advance refunded issues by a
dealer located outside this market would undoubtedly be sold outside this area and
hence would present no difficulty insofar as the scheduling of issues coming to market
was concerned.
During the 1964 legislative session, various amendments were proposed concerning
the existing legislation on advance refunding and these amendments led to considerable
misunderstandings about the whole advance refunding program. The 1964 Legislature
asked the Legislative Council, Committee on Education, to analyze the subject
thoroughly and at that time, Colorado underwriters indicated their wholehearted support
and cooperation to the Coamittee. Mr. Lyle Kyle and Dr. Fitzhugh Carmichael have had
free access to our records to assist them in the preparation of reports you have received, Advance refunding is a specialized technique which requires a consideration
of not only the outstanding issues, but the cost of government obligations used to
retire the outstanding issue and the market acceptance of any proposed new issue,
Relative savings to the issuer is dependent on a combination of all three factors and
hence the comparison of any two refundings is almost meaningless.
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Mr. Lyle C. Kyle
October 27, 1964
Boettcher and Company's pursuit of legislation to allow advance refundings
has resulted in $6.3 million savings to Colorado taxpayers (a sununation of this
amount has been provided to the Legislative Council). The advance refunding concept was conceived as a method of reducing debt payment requirements, thereby
offering a great value to the taxpayers. Such a service on an efficient basis
was motivated by our desire to make a profit. The Legislative Council study will
indicate that such a service was rendered and profits accruing to underwriting
dealers was in an amount which constituted defensible (and perhaps less than
commensurate) return for services rendered and risks undertaken.
Very truly yours,
BOETTCHER AND COMPANY

qi:/~c>ZFred Wiesner

FW/
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